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SCEPTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MELANCHOLY: BURTON, SWIFT, POPE, STERNE 
 
BY CHRISTOPHER TILMOUTH 
 
This article examines common features in Swift, Pope and Sterne’s responses to Burton’s 
Anatomy of Melancholy and the wider humoral tradition. It documents the willingness of 
Swift and Pope simultaneously to take the latter discourse seriously—even to value 
humoral delusion—and yet to satirise its explanatory pretensions and the behavioural 
states it postulates; their tendency, also, to take a Janus-faced view of associated kinds of 
madness, affirming and deriding these concurrently. Sterne then recapitulates that stance 
in assuming a double perspective on hobby-horsical tendencies, and he combines this with 
a feel for the pathos and yet also delight which accompany the inevitable failure of 
Tristram Shandy’s encyclopaedic pretensions. Swift and Sterne especially derive these 
dual perspectives from qualities incipient in the Anatomy, qualities which Burton had kept 
in check. In that respect, they (with Pope) transform humoral thinking into a sceptical 
resource, finding in it material supportive of an ironizing mind-set that willingly entertains 
multiple contradictory ideas at once. Such sceptical perspectivism is, I argue, 
characteristic of all three eighteenth-century authors discussed here and highlights their 
anticipation of Romantic irony.  
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In the critical literature of eighteenth-century melancholy Burton’s Anatomy and the humoral 
tradition it epitomised have played, at best, an incidental role. Mullan’s formative study of 
the Hanoverian ‘spleen’, for instance, concentrates, rather, on the period’s turn to neural 
physiology, taking humoralism’s collapse as read.1 The contributions to Ingram’s collection 
on the same subject trace a bifurcating narrative in which the satirical treatments of 
hypochondria penned by Swift and Pope stand apart from the more soberly contemplative 
strains of Young, Warton, and even Tristram Shandy’s melancholy. Here, too, the Anatomy is 
only occasionally present, the dialogic qualities of Burton’s text (which in fact lend 
themselves to a fusion of satire and sentiment) going unheeded.
2
 Whilst there have been 
particular analyses of how Swift, Pope and Sterne each read Burton, these have never been 
successfully synthesised into a general account that closes the gaps left by Mullan, Ingram et 
al.
3
 The present essay addresses that lacuna, showing how Swift in his account of madness, 
Pope in his portrait of ruling passions, Sterne in his treatment of hobby horses and 
encyclopaedic pretensions, all developed from their engagements with humoralism a Janus-
faced view of melancholy. Granted, this trio turned to the Anatomy as a fund of witty 
material; but they also exploited self-consuming qualities
4
 inchoate in Burton’s text and in 
the humours tradition, making of the latter sceptical resources via which to expose the 
relativism of intellectual authority and articulate what I will call double perspectives 
(mutually incompatible positions of a kind characteristically entertained, I suggest, by writers 
of a dialogic, one might say ‘Scriblerian’ stripe).5 All three of them readily harboured 
contradictory judgements—held in tension contrary perspectives—as they reflected upon 
melancholy.
6
 To argue this, though, is to look beyond the narrative of humoralism’s decline 
and foreshadow instead the part played by Swift, Pope and Sterne in a wider history of 
eighteenth-century scepticism, a history less concerned with Enlightenment Pyrrhonism and 
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more focused on the cultivation of ironic perspectivism as a condition of being.
7
 This will be 
my end-point, but I begin by sketching the view taken of melancholy in the early 1700s. 
 
I 
 
The fate suffered by seventeenth-century humoral discourse at the turn of the new century is 
predictable enough: a subject once treated seriously quickly fell prey to satire. Writing in 
1659, Samuel Butler had presumed that melancholy’s reality and aetiology were self-evident. 
The melancholic mind was literally obnubilated (clouded over) by noxious vapours 
emanating from humoral disturbances below: 
 
[Man’s] Head is haunted, like a House, with evil Spirits and Apparitions, that … fright him 
out of himself, till he stands empty and forsaken … The Fumes and Vapours that rise from 
his Spleen and Hypocondries have so smutched and sullied his Brain (like a Room that 
smoaks) that his Understanding is blear-ey’d, and has no right Perception … His Soul lives 
in his Body, like a Mole in the Earth.
8
 
 
This Galenic account, commonplace throughout the 1600s, was elaborated by Burton. 
According to his Anatomy, when either the body’s natural humour of melancholy 
accumulates to an excess, or any of the four humours spontaneously combusts thereby 
forming unnatural melancholy (a process known as ‘adustion’), the effect is to distemper 
man’s physiology.9 These malign developments may occur throughout the body, or locally in 
the head or hypochondries (in which last context they are accompanied by ‘fulsome 
belchings, continuall winde … heate and griping in their bowels’ (AM 1.411)). Wherever 
situated though, such distempering humours soon putrefy, producing black vapours which 
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ascend through the viscera, darken the animal spirits, and infiltrate the imagination. That 
imagination, once suffused with these vapours, becomes troubled with ‘terrible monstrous 
fictions in a thousand shapes’ (1.419), thus triggering fear and sadness. With that, 
melancholic delusion and its characteristic emotions take hold. Nor can reason check these 
thoughts because, the vapours within being virtually undetectable, the fantasies which flow 
from them appear real. Melancholic conceits therefore prove tenacious: ‘still, still, still 
thinking of it … Though they doe talke with you … still that toy runnes in their minde, that 
feare, that suspition, that abuse … that crotchet, that whimsie’ (1.393).10 Henry More seized 
on this last point in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, interpreting dissenters’ fanaticism as its own 
kind of melancholy because theirs, too, was a condition of possession by ‘one particular 
absurd Imagination’.11 He continued: 
 
The Spirit … that wings the Enthusiast … is nothing else but that Flatulency which is in the 
Melancholy complexion, and rises out of the Hypochondriacal humour … Which fume 
mounting into the Head … fills the Mind with variety of Imaginations, and so quickens … 
Invention, that it makes the Enthusiast to admiration fluent and eloquent.
12
 
 
For More, then, mystical interpretations of Scripture, quaking, and visions were all products 
of the monomaniac fantasies of madmen gripped by hypochondriac melancholy.
13
  
 
More used humoral theory to demean dissenters’ spiritual pretensions but showed no more 
inclination than Burton or Butler to question the truth of the discourse he was appropriating. 
Conversely, by 1700 both melancholy itself and humoral accounts of it were in doubt. In 
1701, for instance, Anne Finch asked sceptically,  
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What art thou, Spleen, which everything does ape?  
Thou Proteus to abused mankind,  
Who never yet thy real cause could find  
Or fix thee to remain in one continued shape. (‘The Spleen’, ll. 1-4)14  
 
Finch thought that ‘Falsely, the mortal part we blame’ for our delusions (l. 25) and, 
throughout her Pindaric, oscillated between acknowledging melancholy’s ‘terrible’ power (l. 
77) and suspecting that such sentiments were factitious. In that latter respect she 
foreshadowed Tatlers 47, 80 and 181 and Spectators 53, 336 and 547 which depicted 
melancholy as fashion’s fabrication.15 Above all, though, it was Swift and Pope who satirised 
melancholy’s rehearsed, formulaic nature. When the Tale of a Tub’s pretentious spokesman, 
Paulson’s ‘Hack’, criticises Homer’s supposed failure to provide ‘a compleat Account of the 
Spleen’, the real point of the remark—Swift’s ironic purpose—is to highlight melancholy’s 
status as a modern construction unknown to the ancients.
16
 Gulliver concurs. He is appalled 
by one Yahoo whom ‘Fancy would sometimes take … to retire into a Corner, to lie down and 
howl … and spurn away all that came near him’.17 The operative word here is ‘Fancy’, 
implying that spleen, a condition that ‘only seizeth on the Lazy, the Luxurious, and the Rich’, 
is a wilful indulgence.  
 
Canto IV of The Rape of the Lock presents another such view.
18
 Belinda’s lock having 
been cut, Pope inserts a journey to the underworld, despatching Umbriel to the Cave of 
Spleen to invoke its goddess’s influence over his heroine. The cave features every 
conceivable trope of melancholy: a ‘dreaded East’ wind; stagnant vapours; ‘Spectres, gaping 
Tombs’ (ll. 20, 44). Its absurd occupants personify eighteenth-century equivalents of the 
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delusional conditions attributed to early modern melancholics, those who believed 
themselves made of glass, butter, leather, etc.,
19
 hence:  
 
Here living Teapots stand, one Arm held out,  
One bent; the Handle this, and that the Spout:  
………………………………………………. 
Here sighs a Jar, and there a Goose-pye talks;  
………………………………………………. 
And Maids turn’d Bottels, call aloud for Corks. (ll. 49-50, 52, 54)  
 
This surfeit of clichés renders the cave allegory even more ostentatiously figurative than the 
rest of the poem’s supernatural machinery and so encourages a sense of the target emotion’s 
contrived nature. Melancholy emerges as less a natural passion than a rhetorical display, and 
it is therefore appropriate that, when we find Spleen, she has ‘Pain at her Side, and Megrin at 
her Head’ (l. 24): ‘at’, not ‘in’, because these handmaids are contrived appurtenances, not the 
intrinsic parts of a truly organic emotion. Personified ‘Affectation’ is in attendance too, 
supplying the socially conditioned gestures—‘hang[ing] the Head aside’, ‘On the rich Quilt 
sink[ing] with becoming Woe’ (ll. 33, 35) —through which melancholy performs itself. 
Spleen herself furnishes Umbriel with a bag of fury and a vial of tears to cast upon Belinda. 
Again, however, Pope encourages incredulity. The heroine’s ‘Rage, Resentment and Despair’ 
have already been established as fact at the Canto’s opening, before Umbriel departs, and she 
is thoroughly ‘dejected’ by the time he returns (ll. 9, 90). So although Umbriel dispenses his 
malign gifts, they impart only affected exaggeration to emotions already present and in no 
need of forced embellishment.  
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Clearly, Pope and Swift were intent on satirising ‘the spleen’, sapping all force from the 
language of vapours; yet, as I now want to demonstrate, their reflections on the subject were 
ultimately more various, more dialectical, than the Rape’s mock-epic might suggest.  
 
II 
 
In Section XI of A Tale of a Tub Swift’s Hack remarks upon man’s ‘Six Senses’, ‘six’, that is, 
‘Including Scaliger’s’ (TT 131). So precise a recollection of Burton’s Anatomy (which 
likewise recognises Scaliger’s ‘Sense of Titillation’ (AM 1.150)20) underlines the intimate 
connection between these texts already proved by Harth.
21
 Before turning to the Tale’s 
invocations of humoral tradition though, it is worth recalling the anti-materialist context in 
which Swift situated the discourse of the spleen. Like other works written in a Scriblerian 
style, the Tale’s purposes include ridiculing the materialism of natural philosophy’s efforts to 
explain human behaviour, specifically by magnifying that philosophy’s literal-mindedness to 
the point of absurdity.
22
 Hence the ‘Physico-logical Scheme of Oratorical Receptacles’ 
parodies contemporary efforts to attribute mass to the air by mock-postulating that words 
(being aerial ‘Bodies of much Weight’) are best spoken from on high that they may drop into 
gaping audience mouths below (TT 38-9, 350 n. 20). Likewise, Swift derides the materialist, 
commodifying tendencies of the Moderns’ approach to learning by having his Hack report an 
alchemical technique for distilling books into inhalable liquid (82, 399-400 nn. 17-18). 
Above all, the Tale disparages materialism’s tendency to reify man’s soul. What the Hack 
describes approvingly, Swift holds up for ridicule: 
 
what is Man himself but a Micro-Coat … a compleat Suit of Cloaths with all its Trimmings? 
… those Beings which the World calls improperly Suits of Cloaths, are in Reality the most 
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refined … Rational Creatures. For, is it not manifest, that They live, and move, and talk, and 
perform all other Offices of Human Life? Are not Beauty, and Wit, and Mien, and Breeding, 
their inseparable Proprieties? … Is it not they who walk the Streets, fill up Parliament—, 
Coffee—, Play—, Bawdy–Houses … Man [is] an Animal compounded of two Dresses, the 
Natural and the Celestial Suit, which [are] the Body and the Soul: … the Soul [is] the 
outward, and the Body the inward Cloathing. (49-50) 
 
Inverting past beliefs, Swift’s satire makes what was once thought an excrescence suddenly 
lay claim to be essential: the body is now that within and the soul is literally vested in man’s 
outward garments. Implicitly, this new soul is, for Swift, no soul at all; his allegiance is to 
Christian tradition’s altogether less materialist pneumatology. However, the reduction of that 
traditional soul to mere ghost in the machine, superseded now by so many fine liveries, 
reflects, Swift insinuates, a wider moral torpor, England’s addiction to politeness and 
consumerism. 
 
 Since melancholy’s aetiology places it at the interface between body and soul, as a 
condition in which vaporous particles ‘obnubilate’ the senses and thence the understanding 
(thereby suggesting that the soul is open to material influence), the Tale’s persistent recourse 
to this explanatory framework sits awkwardly with its implied anti-materialist pneumatology. 
This tension correlates with Swift’s adopting a double perspective in respect of the spleen. 
On the one hand, he appropriates humoral language at face value, using it to document, in 
salacious, belittling terms, his fictional characters’ supposed faiths. On the other hand, he also 
satirises this, the very language of explanation which he adopts. The Tale’s appropriation of 
humoral discourse
23
 is apparent in the framing of Peter’s Romanism and Jack’s Calvinism as 
manifestations of delusion. Both conceive ‘the strangest Imaginations’ (73), each of ‘the 
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same Foundation’ (128). Peter’s monomania focuses around the delusion that bread is in fact 
mutton, its dry crust a claret. In other respects he enjoys ‘lucid Intervals’ (77)—a stock 
phrase in the contemporary vernacular of madness (394, n. 56)—but where these perceptions 
intervene his imagination is as dogmatic as the stereotypical melancholic who thinks himself 
vitreous. Meantime, as Harth demonstrates, Jack (being ‘run mad with Spleen’ (94)) 
subscribes to a version of More’s diagnosis of enthusiasm, but as if this were a creed rather 
than a bit of nosology. Jack and his sect take literally the precept that the soul is a kind of 
wind, and so fart and belch freely (‘the Sourer the better’ (101)) as a means of disseminating 
that breath of God. These Æolists imagine themselves skilled in bottling the winds of 
‘í’ (meaning Calvinist Scotland but also ‘the Land of Darkness’ and so melancholy). 
Thus equipped, they refresh their divine inspiration via regular enemas—‘not … without 
much Pain and Gripings’, as per Burton’s hypochondriac melancholics—and then 
‘disembogue whole Tempests upon [their] Auditories’ (102). In sum, Jack’s ilk actively 
cultivate Burton-cum-More’s hypochondriac flatulence in the mad conviction that it is a truly 
pious condition, turning diagnosis into positive dogma. To this extent, Swift treats the 
language of humoral nosology as if literally true and exploits its lurid descriptiveness to 
satirise non-Anglicans’ spiritual pretensions. 
 
Nevertheless, even as Swift does this, he simultaneously demeans the paradigm of 
humoral diagnosis by pushing it to the limit of absurdity.
24
 Ubiquitous talk of flatulence not 
only mocks the Calvinists but makes a joke of scientific discourse itself in a manner 
continuous with the Tale’s hostility to materialism. By giving the idea of hypochondriac 
motions the most literal expression possible, Swift emphasises the folly of pretending that 
such discourse might in any sense explain the mind’s operations. Further accounts of frenzy 
in the Tale’s ‘Digression … of Madness’ (105) compound this impression. There, the Hack 
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glibly maintains that proponents of new philosophical schemes, empire-builders, and 
religious enthusiasts are all governed by the same aetiology—the humoral notion of 
melancholy. We are to believe that the occurrence of such innovative ‘Imaginations’ as 
Descartes’ vision of vortices can only be explained by recourse to the phenomenon of 
‘Vapours, ascending from the lower Faculties, to water the [Understanding’s] Invention’ and 
so spawn these ideas (108, 105). Likewise, Henri IV’s bellicose designs upon the Hapsburgs 
are ascribed to what Burton called ‘Venus omitted’, that is, when unspent semen putrefies—
in Swift’s terms, becomes ‘adust’—and ‘sends up poysoned vapours to the Braine’ (AM 
1.230, TT 106, 429 n. 11). The problem with this generic ‘vapour’ argument is that it cannot 
account for the individuality of the different visions (Descartes’, Henri’s) under discussion 
here. Acknowledging this, Swift’s Hack attributes such variation to the uniqueness of each 
person’s brain, the different ‘Soils’ upon which watering vapours act (106). Yet just as he 
begins to outline exactly how ‘numerical Differences in the Brain, can produce Effects of so 
vast a Difference from the same Vapour, as to be the sole Point of Individuation between 
Alexander the Great, Jack of Leyden, and Monsieur Des Cartes’ (109), the Tale’s putative 
manuscript breaks off, only to resume with the words ‘And this I take to be a clear Solution 
of the Matter’ (110). Swift’s contrived silence mocks the vacuity of the model in play, its 
actual failure to explicate the particularity of different minds. Melancholy’s vocabulary of 
fumes and evacuations is shown to be too literal-minded, too reductively materialist, to 
accommodate the soul’s complexities. In fact, Swift implies that this mode of analysis 
constitutes its own kind of melancholy since there is a singularity of vision about it, a still, 
still, still thinking upon the same crotchet, the same whimsy, the same old notion of smoky 
fumes, that itself suggests the very monomania this theory would explain. A discourse which 
was taken as read is thus simultaneously satirised as self-parodying, a fact which illustrates 
the Scriblerian proclivity for entertaining double perspectives on the same one thing. 
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Such double perspectives abound. Hitherto I have implied that the Tale distinguishes 
sharply between its Hack and the ironizing shadow cast by Swift, but actually that distinction 
blurs. For instance, when the Hack protests over-fulsomely that ‘our Noble Moderns … most 
edifying Volumes I turn indefatigably over Night and Day, for the Improvement of my Mind, 
and the good of my Country’ (62), and when he commends Wotton’s writings as ‘never to be 
sufficiently valued’ (83), it is unclear to whom the ironic barbs couched within these remarks 
should be imputed: whether to the speaker (presuming him to be self-conscious) or Swift. 
That uncertainty pertains most in the ‘Digression … of Madness’. For all that that chapter’s 
theorising flatulence invites ridicule, the absurdity of the Hack’s thinking suddenly becomes 
less clear-cut when he infers from his account of melancholy that happiness is but ‘a 
perpetual Possession of being well Deceived’ (111). ‘How shrunk is every Thing, as it 
appears in the Glass of Nature’, he observes. The ‘Imagination can build nobler Scenes’: 
better to inhabit those. The wisdom of this claim is neither easily conceded nor easily 
repulsed, and Swift compounds these Janus-faced credentials in what follows: 
 
whatever Philosopher … can find out an Art to sodder and patch up the Flaws and 
Imperfections of Nature, will deserve much better of Mankind, and teach us a more useful 
Science, than that so much in present Esteem, of widening and exposing them … Such a 
Man truly wise, creams off Nature, leaving … the Dregs, for … Reason to lap up. This is the 
sublime and refined Point of Felicity, called the Possession of being well deceived; The 
Serene Peaceful State of being a Fool among Knaves. (112) 
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The italicised phrase here derives from a garrulous ‘fine Lady’, object of the satire in 
Rochester’s ‘Letter from Artemiza in the Towne to Chloe in the Countrey’, who insists upon 
‘The perfect joy of being well deceaved’ (ll. 74, 115).25 But just as Rochester’s poem, whilst 
mocking this ‘Lady’ throughout, nonetheless hints at the wisdom of her precept by aligning 
it with admirable Artemiza’s taste for passions that ‘make the nauseous draught of Life goe 
downe’ (ll. 44-5),26 so the credo of Swift’s Hack exerts a moral appeal even as it disowns 
‘Reason’ and truth. Better indeed to be a ‘Fool’, perhaps, if the only alternative is to wallow 
in human imperfections. Again, double perspectives are entertained. The Tale’s persona, 
predominantly a source of risible misjudgements, momentarily commands an indeterminate 
degree of sympathy for prompting us to see good in the very melancholic delusions we 
otherwise mock. This intimation is never stable, however. The voice which would confine 
our view to ‘the Surface’, ‘the Superficies of Things’, and which eschews ‘Anatomy’s’ 
‘officious’ intrusions (TT 111-12), is the same which earlier expected readers to ‘inspect 
beyond the … Rind of Things’ and was eager to present ‘a very compleat Anatomy’ of man 
(41, 81). Furthermore, the example offered now in defence of the taste for outsides over 
insides is Swift’s notoriously troubling remark, ‘Last Week I saw a Woman flay’d, and you 
will hardly believe, how much it altered her Person for the worse’ (112).27 This is certainly a 
graphic proof that surface beauties appeal more than do visceral depths, a proof so graphic 
that Rawson thinks the example gratuitously ‘over-appropriate’ to the moral it purports to 
uphold.
28
 But perhaps the point of this manner of articulation—the Hack presuming we will 
share in his indifference and then surprise—is to reveal the danger inherent in too shallow an 
engagement with reality, namely that such detachment promotes inhumanity. Again, 
therefore, Swift shifts the perspective to disorienting effect, this time away from that 
superficiality and pleasantly delusory blindness which, a moment ago, the text had seemed 
to endorse. On the Tale’s evidence, then, trenchant though Swift was in identifying with 
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High Church religion and Old Whig or Tory politics,
29
 his attitude towards moral 
rationalism was anything but stable.
30
  
 
Further to this, just as the ‘Digression … of Madness’ throws into relief the potential 
happiness derivable from melancholic delusions, so it also relativizes ‘madness’. The speaker 
posits that ‘there is a peculiar String in the Harmony of Human Understanding’ which, in 
different individuals, may be ‘of the same Tuning’, so that if one encounters others of like 
‘Pitch’ they will deem you sane and if of a jarring note they will ‘call you Mad’ (108).31 ‘A 
Fool in one Company’ may be ‘Philosopher’ in another, just as we treat ‘Curtius with 
Reverence … Empedocles, with … Contempt’ though both ‘leapt into a Gulph’ (109, 113).32 
Here again is the Tale’s perspectivism. Swift makes political satire from it,33 his Hack 
suggesting that Bedlam’s occupants could find roles in public life because every so-called 
mad symptom has its corollary in the putatively sane world: ‘Is any Student [of Bedlam] … 
Swearing and Blaspheming, biting his Grate, foaming at the Mouth? … give him a Regiment 
of Dragoons, and send him into Flanders among the Rest. Is another eternally talking, 
sputtering, gaping, bawling? … away with Him to Westminster-Hall’ (113-15). Multiple 
examples ensue, each emphasising that incarcerated man is no madder than his socialised 
counterpart. The list ends abruptly with a crazy tailor, the text then succumbing to another 
pretended gap in Swift’s manuscript of which only a fragment remains: ‘---Heark in your 
Ear---’ (116). A printer’s footnote—Swift in disguise—claims not to know what this means, 
but the line (largely ignored by critics) is arguably Lear’s, spoken to blinded Gloucester: ‘see 
how yond justice rails upon yond simple thief. Hark in thine ear: change places, and handy-
dandy, which is the justice, which is the thief?’ (King Lear 4.6.151-4).34 Granted, Swift’s 
phrase appears in Nashe’s Unfortunate Traveller35 and in variant form in Troilus and 
Cressida (5.2.34), implying that it had idiomatic currency, but the resonance with Lear 
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suggests a specific allusion to that. Lear’s point anticipates the Tale’s, that distinctions 
between the empowered and marginalised (in Lear’s case, judge and thief, beadle and whore) 
are arbitrary. Significantly, however, Shakespeare’s character observes this whilst beset by an 
ambiguous madness, oscillating between insanity and insight—between ‘fie, fie! pah, pah!’ 
and ‘I know thee well enough, thy name is Gloucester’, ‘kill, kill, kill!’ and ‘they told me I 
was everything. ’Tis a lie, I am not ague-proof’ (4.6.129, 177, 187, 104-5). As Edgar says, 
‘O, matter and impertinency mix’d, Reason in madness’ (174-5).  
 
Swift’s fragmentary allusion, therefore, is richly suggestive. It may, of course, be the crazy 
tailor’s own ventriloquizing of Lear; but equally this demand to be heard may be the Hack’s, 
or even Swift’s interjection. If the Hack’s, the effect is again to cast a double perspective over 
this persona’s judgements, to suggest that what seems folly’s voice might nonetheless be 
enlightening, an insight into the sanity of the deluded. If Swift’s, perhaps the Tale’s inventor 
here glimpses in himself a second Lear, barking at a mad world in a mixture of matter and 
impertinency whilst feeling uncomfortably complicit with the very madness he exposes. The 
Hack hints that he himself was once a Bedlam inmate (TT 113), and, having rooted delusion 
in those hobby-horsical moments when ‘Man’s Fancy gets astride on his Reason’, then 
concedes, ‘even I … am a Person, whose Imaginations are … exceedingly disposed to run 
away with his Reason’ (110, 116). But perhaps these revelations, too, tell against the Hack’s 
creator. After all, this Tale, this satire on melancholy, concedes that ‘the Satyrical Itch’ itself 
derives from ‘beyond the Tweed’ (i.e., ‘í’, ‘the Land of Darkness’), the implication 
being that the real Swift’s own métier is a case of the spleen—‘the Author’s Spleen’ to 
which, in another reversal, the work’s eventual ‘Conclusion’ would suddenly have us ‘give 
some Allowance’ (30, 135). Whatever its application though, the Lear allusion’s resonances 
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emphasise the plausibility of the ‘Digression’s’ claim that madness is relative, a perspectival 
judgement. 
 
 With that thought The Anatomy of Melancholy leaps back into view because, whereas the 
Anatomy proper attempts to localise melancholy to specific pathologies focused in specific 
individuals, Burton’s preface, ‘Democritus Junior to the Reader’, meditates rather on the 
universal melancholy cum madness that afflicts us all.
36
 The distinction here is between 
transitory bouts of melancholy to which all succumb whenever they fail to govern their 
passions (a failure which temporarily distempers the body), and the habitual, inveterate 
melancholy which afflicts only the few (in whom an established pathology sets in due to their 
sustained misgovernance). The important point for Burton is that this step from everyday 
folly to habitual melancholy is imperceptible: ‘To some it is in disposition, to another in 
habit; … one is melancholicus ad octo, a second two degrees lesse, a third halfe way. ’Tis 
super particular’ (AM 1.404). Even the sanest, ‘soundest of us all’ must therefore imagine 
ourselves balanced on ‘a steep rocke’, perpetually ‘in danger to be precipitated’ (1.408, 419-
20). The distinction between soundness and madness, one of degree not kind, is opaque. The 
relevance of this claim to the Tale’s argument will be self-evident, but it also pertains to the 
question of authorial self-presentation. Crucially for Swift, Burton uses his Democritus 
persona to play out the Anatomy’s anxiety about sanity’s instability. At times in his preface 
Burton identifies with Democritus, Democritus the satirist and disciplined rationalist whose 
‘Ironicall passion’ (1.33), born of moral authority, enables him to stand apart from the 
world’s madness. Elsewhere Burton concedes, instead, precisely his own immersion in that 
world’s universal melancholy: ‘I write of Melancholy … being busie to avoid Melancholy’; 
‘I have anatomized mine own folly’ (1.6, 112). From this second position, Burton speculates 
that Democritus, more than he, may be the real madman: a misanthropic satirist, absurdly 
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intolerant of those little follies and imperfections intrinsic to humanity. Hence Burton’s 
periodic efforts to dissociate himself from this all ‘too Satyricall’ figure: ‘’tis not I, but 
Democritus, Democritus dixit’ (1.110). It is these oscillatory movements—the self-
consuming, dialogic features of the Anatomy—that Swift mirrors as he variously endorses 
and satirizes his Bedlamite Hack, or slides in and out of Lear’s voice, even as his text 
meditates on lunacy’s fragile boundaries. However, the difference here is that, whereas 
Burton was no sceptic, Swift’s exaggerated extension of the Anatomy’s perspectival 
possibilities does work to sceptical effect. In this regard, Swift compares with Pope, but to 
understand his treatment of humoral psychology I turn first to The Guardian.  
 
III 
 
Despite Addison and Steele’s general hostility to ‘singularity’ of behaviour and merely 
imaginary forms of self-existence, Guardian 144 celebrates ‘British humours’, maintaining 
that every Englishman has ‘a peculiar Cast of Head, some uncommon Whim’—some 
‘Original Humour’—that ‘distinguishes him from others’.37 Individual idiosyncrasies, which 
in Jonson or The Tatler and Spectator would have been indices of absurdity, departures from 
complexional balance, here become badges of pride to be cherished. Steele’s inspiration for 
this Whiggish conviction (which made permitting men ‘their own way of thinking … a 
standing bulwark of [our] Liberties’) was Temple’s ‘Upon Poetry’: 
 
This [humorous quality] may proceed from the Native Plenty of our Soil, the Unequalness of 
our Climate, as well as the Ease of our Government, and the Liberty of professing Opinions 
and Factions, which perhaps our Neighbours have about them, but are forced to disguise … 
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Thus we … have more Originals, and more that appear what they are: … more Humour, 
because every Man follows his own, and takes a Pleasure, perhaps a Pride, to shew it.
38
 
 
In sum, behaviours deemed expressive of abnormal psychology and all that was malign about 
‘the English malady’ in the seventeenth century were, by 1713, being vaunted as markers of 
splendid normality, the best of Britishness. 
 
Pope’s verse essays voice a related view, equating individual identity with each person’s 
‘Ruling Passion’, some one dominant emotion. In the Epistle to Cobham this idée fixe, a 
petty madness, is conceived not as aberrant but as man’s essence, a trait poets may satirise, 
yet also the focus of energetic being: ‘In this one Passion man can strength enjoy, / As Fits 
give vigour, just when they destroy’ (ll. 222-3).39 Epistle II of the Essay on Man repeats the 
point.
40
 There, the ruling passion begins as ‘The Mind’s disease’, its distempering and so 
‘peccant part’ (ll. 138, 144), as per the traditional perspective of humoral discourse. However, 
‘Th’Eternal Art’—Providence—‘educing good from ill, / Grafts on this Passion our best 
principle’, turning it to virtuous effect even whilst ‘Nature’s vigour works at the root’, and so 
rendering the dysfunctional functional (ll. 175-6, 184):  
 
What crops of wit and honesty appear 
From spleen, from obstinacy, hate, or fear! 
See anger, zeal and fortitude supply; 
Ev’n av’rice, prudence; sloth, philosophy; 
…………………………………………... 
Nor Virtue, male or female, can we name, 
But what will grow on Pride, or grow on Shame. (ll. 185-8, 193-4) 
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As lines 193-4 signal, this argument ameliorates the thesis of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, 
its reach extending even to Swift, the figure whose ruling passion of ‘spleen’ (confessionally 
emphasised in the Tale) morphs into honest wit.
41
 Gulph-plugging Curtius is cited here too, 
as one whose ‘ambition’ makes him a ‘patriot’ just as it makes of another—in Pope’s case 
‘Catiline’ to Swift’s Empedocles—a ‘knave’ (ll. 199-202). We are reminded, therefore, of the 
Tale’s contention that the crazy may be domesticated for civic service, so permeable is the 
frontier between madness and sanity. Pope similarly risks relativizing virtue by occluding the 
boundary between it and man’s master passion or humour: ‘the diff’rence’ may become ‘too 
nice / Where ends the Virtue, or begins the Vice’ (ll. 209-10). Even as he acknowledges this 
danger he resists it, insisting, ‘If white and black blend, soften, and unite / A thousand ways, 
is there no black or white?’ (ll. 213-14). Yet these lines are no sooner proffered than 
undermined, Pope likening attempts to define ‘th’Extreme of Vice’ to asking ‘where’s the 
North? at York, ’tis on the Tweed; / In Scotland, at the Orcades; and there, / At Greenland 
…’ (ll. 221-4). A sceptical perspectivism is thus established which eventually returns the 
Essay to the ruling passion’s status as our ‘peccant’, that is, mortally diseased, ‘part’. To it we 
may owe ‘true friendship, love sincere, / Each home-felt joy’, but it is also an agent of 
‘decay’ that induces ‘death’ (ll. 253-60). 
 
 The pirouettes turned in the Essay on Man in respect of ruling passions’ value had already 
led Pope, in the variorum Dunciad, to make those monomaniac fantasies the stuff of satire. 
That poem’s third book imagines Tibbald draped across Dulness’s lap and ‘curtain’d round 
with vapours blue’ (l. 3).42 From these obscuring fumes stems (the text implies) every 
dunce’s ruling passion,  
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the Fool’s paradise, the Statesman’s scheme,  
The air-built Castle, and the golden Dream, 
The Maid’s romantic wish, the Chymist’s flame, 
And Poet’s vision of eternal fame. (ll. 9-12) 
 
Such visions are satirically dismissed here; not so in the Essay on Man’s second Epistle. The 
latter, despite contending that providence can redeem ruling passions by appropriating them 
for virtue’s purposes, nonetheless ends by envisaging the opposite—that individuals might 
better be left to enjoy those obsessions in their raw, unimproved form; and what they enjoy 
are the very manias mocked in Dunciad III:  
 
See the blind beggar dance, the cripple sing,  
The sot a hero, lunatic a king;  
The starving chemist in his golden views  
Supremely blest, the poet in his muse. (ll. 267-70)  
 
Pope recognises these fixations as adult equivalents of ‘toys’ and ‘baubles’ (ll. 280-1), but 
now, far from satirising this fact, greets it with amused indulgence. Again perspectival 
reversals are therefore apparent, as they are also in the Horatian ‘Epistle II.ii.’43 This work 
recalls with plaintive fondness a Peer  
 
Who, tho’the House was up, delighted sate, 
Heard, noted, answer’d, as in full Debate: 
In all but this, a man of sober Life, 
Fond of his Friend, and civil to his Wife, 
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…………………………………………... 
Him, the damn’d Doctors and his Friends immur’d, 
They bled, they cupp’d, they purg’d; in short, they cur’d: 
Whereat the Gentleman began to stare— 
My Friends? he cry’d, p–x take you for your care! 
That from a Patriot of distinguish’d note, 
Have bled and purg’d me to a simple Vote. (ll. 186-97) 
 
The implication is that this character was better off and possessed greater integrity when 
living within his delusion than he is now, cured of that monomania. The geniality of Pope’s 
recollection suggests, here, a wistful, even melancholic fondness for precisely that structure 
of madness so characteristic of melancholy and so belittled elsewhere in Pope’s verse. 
Doubleness of attitude prevails, just as in Swift’s Tub, and as before the effect is to throw into 
sceptical relief attempts to pass judgement on madness.
44
  
 
The same doubleness proliferates in Book IV of Gulliver’s Travels. The satirist who 
pictured Houyhnhnms riding in sledges drawn by Yahoos evidently remembered Burton’s 
Democritus who, amidst his vision of mankind’s universal madness, professed to see ‘horses 
ride in a Coach, men draw it’ (AM 1.54). However, the Travels’ connection to the Anatomy 
goes deeper than this since Swift’s is another work that recapitulates Burton’s Janus-faced 
view of sanity. Throughout his narrative Swift uses scalar contrasts to establish (in a manner 
reminiscent of Sextus Empiricus’ modes of scepticism) the extent to which judgement is 
perspectival.
45
 Different characters’ senses of height and distance in Lilliput and Brobdingnag 
underline the truism that ‘nothing is greater or little otherwise than by Comparison’ (GT 124). 
Likewise, close encounters with skin, breasts, and body lice relativize the idea of beauty, 
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Gulliver recognising that what disgusts him about the Brobdingnagians disgusted the 
Lilliputians about him (130-1, 159, 168). Body odour is rendered similarly contingent, the 
Lilliputians revolting at Gulliver’s stench as he does at the Brobdingnagians because ‘Sense 
[is] more acute in Proportion to … Littleness’ (167). These instances of perspectivism 
prepare readers for Book IV’s volte-face. During his stay in Houyhnhnm-land, it is Gulliver’s 
narratorial perspective that dominates Swift’s chapters. Swift coerces readers into accepting 
his hero’s misanthropic view of the Yahoos. Regarding Lemuel as, comparatively, a sane, 
discriminating figure, we share his distaste for these vulgar bipeds. However, once back in 
human company, where Gulliver’s outlook is measured against the benevolent Captain 
Pedro’s, then against his loving family’s, such misanthropy appears mad. Gulliver’s attitudes 
have not, in fact, changed—only the context in which we view them has—but it is as if Swift, 
having initially admired his hero’s moral rigour, now recognises the value of a little wilful 
self-delusion when confronting Englishmen’s Yahoo-like shortcomings. A ‘Serene Peaceful 
State of being a Fool among Knaves’ is called for, and Gulliver is convicted for his want of it. 
The effect is to impress on us, in Burtonian fashion, the tenuous relativity of judgements 
about sanity. 
 
IV 
 
By the mid-eighteenth century accounts of melancholy premised upon principles of humoral 
physiology were all but defunct. Anatomists had found no chimney-like passages within the 
body, no fumes ‘wafting up from the guts and smoking out the brain’.46 Although at any 
given moment competing discourses continued to exist side by side, the explanatory focus 
had gradually been shifting since the late 1600s, first to iatrochemical, then to hydrodynamic, 
and finally to mechanist cum vitalist pathologies which identified melancholy with torpor and 
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rigidity in the nerve fluid inhibiting the nerves’ capacity to transmit vibratory motions.47 By 
the time Sterne wrote Tristram Shandy the ‘nervous’ language of hypochondria and ‘the 
spleen’ was well-established (as was the fashion, born of ‘Il Penseroso’, for cultivating a 
melancholic sensibility). However, whilst the novel shows a keen familiarity with the new 
nervous discourse of Whytt and Cheyne, its preoccupation with ‘Hobby Horses’ is equally 
rooted in the Popian notion of ‘ruling passion’ and Swift’s language of Fancy getting astride 
Reason—hence, in Burton’s humoralism; and, like Pope’s Essays, Tristram Shandy turns its 
material to genially comic but also sceptical effect.
48
 
 
 A melancholy shadow expressive of a Burtonian ‘sorrowful consciousness’49 but also 
related to the mid-century’s Miltonic, contemplative tastes certainly haunts Tristram. 
Anxieties about loss pervade a novel which chronicles asthma attacks, crushed noses, and 
groins beset by shrapnel, chestnuts and sash windows, and which mourns the deaths of 
Yorick, Bobby, Le Fever, Trim, and (proleptically) Tristram himself. Man’s capacity for 
voluntary self-torment adds to that mix, Walter and Tristram deriving ‘melancholy’ 
foreboding from every step of the latter’s genesis that violates Walter’s precious theories, 
whether the disrupted moment of the boy’s conception so damaging to the animal spirits (‘’tis 
too melancholy’), the bungled delivery detrimental to nose and cerebellum alike (‘this part of 
my story … most … melancholy’), or the erroneous christening (‘TRISTRAM—Melancholy 
dissyllable of sound!’ (TS 1.354, 254, 64)). Yet, despite all this, Tristram is actually written 
‘against the spleen’ (1.360).50 Its ‘fanciful guise of careless disport’ and invitations to 
laughter serve to dispel those ‘bilious and more saturnine passions’ which create disorderly 
‘humours’, to ‘open the heart and lungs’, and to ‘force the blood … to run freely’ (1.359-60, 
401-2), exactly as Swift’s Tale aimed to ‘clear the Breast and … Lungs’ with laughter and so 
be ‘Soverain against the Spleen’ (TT 119).  
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 Sterne accomplished this therapeutic volte-face by making hobby-horsical behaviour 
(potentially the locus of melancholy consciousness) an object of delight. Like Pope and 
Steele, he transformed such monomaniac delusions as seemed to Burton definitive of 
madness into laudable, lovable indices of the Englishman’s character, idiosyncrasies with 
which there need be ‘no disputing’ and which could innocently assist one to ‘canter away 
from … cares and solicitudes’ (TS 1.12, 2.716). Hence, although Toby’s preoccupation with 
recreating every detail that precipitated his battlefield trauma risks becoming obsessive, 
exacerbating the symptoms from which it is meant to distract (1.103-4), it is also the quality 
that ‘electrifies’ him—as when Walter catches him ‘riding at … a desperate rate’ as he 
imagines marching up a glacis (1.86, 353). Walter, equally, is animated by the very 
preoccupations which simultaneously lay him open to ‘whimsical distresses’ (1.256), namely 
his fixation on the manner of Tristram’s propagation, delivery and christening. And Tristram, 
too, is happy to indulge himself, acknowledging that he is ‘mounted’ precisely when 
composing the Life and Opinions: ‘What a rate have I gone on at, curvetting and frisking it 
away’—the terms are from dressage—‘for four volumes together, without looking once 
behind … to see whom I trod upon!’ (1.356). Writing, then, is the direct expression of hobby-
horsicalness, emphatically so in the inset narrative of Slawkenbergius’s tale since the point of 
the joke there is to invert and normalise a stock symptom of melancholy, rendering comical 
what might otherwise be disturbing. A common trope of Renaissance medical case-books, 
Burton’s included (AM 1.420, 2.112), was the patient who anxiously deluded himself that he 
had an enormous nose and so would not venture out lest he damage it. Sterne makes that nose 
real (within Slawkenbergius’s fictional world) and transfers the neurotic fetishizing of this 
organ on to those who witness it rather than he who bears it, thereby finding humour (and 
denying melancholy) in the very place where medical tradition prompts expectations of the 
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opposite. This reversal illustrates in miniature the tonal shift implicit across the novel in its 
translation of fuliginous vapours into hobby-horses. Since, however, this is set against the 
work’s aforementioned undercurrent of melancholy, the overall impression is of Sterne 
following the lead of Swift and Pope in entertaining perspectival shifts. 
 
 The self-consuming parts of Burton’s Anatomy anticipate Sterne’s ludic propensity. 
Burton’s fidgeting with his persona, for example, to which I have already referred—‘’tis not 
I, but Democritus, Democritus dixit’—is part of a wider game of denying his own text. 
Periodically, he mock-condemns the larcenies of his cento-work and ‘this scribling age’ of 
humanism: like ‘Apothecaries we make new mixtures every day, poure out of one Vessell 
into another … weave the same Web still, twist the same Rope againe and againe’ (AM 1.8-
10). The addresses to the reader that follow such sham confessions vacillate, equally 
playfully, between defiance and apology: hence, ‘I confesse all (’tis partly affected) thou 
canst not thinke worse of me then I doe of my selfe. ’Tis not worth the reading’, versus ‘if 
you like not this, get you to another Inne; … goe read something else’ (1.12, 14). This 
oscillation pervades the ‘Democritus’ preface, culminating in the reversals of the latter’s 
closing pages: ‘I owe thee nothing, (Reader) I looke for no favour at thy hands … No, I 
recant … I have spoken foolishly’ (1.112). Such sentiments then disappear in the Anatomy 
proper but they are reprised in Partition 3’s preface. In another, similarly ludic vein, the 
Anatomy is described as written to distract from (and so evacuate) melancholy. It is Burton’s 
‘playing labour … to ease my minde’, and is likewise offered to readers to ‘recreate’ and 
‘recitifie’ them (1.7, 3.5). This is why digressions, indulgences of Burton’s own ‘roving 
humour’ such as ‘of Ayre’ (an Icaromenippean voyage) and Partition 3’s 265-page discussion 
of love-melancholy (a ‘delightsome field’ to ‘refresh my muse … and my weary Readers’), 
abound (1.4, 3.4). However, crucially, these relieving episodes are just that: episodes, 
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carefully localised within the text. Whilst such interludes intimate the possibility of an 
alternative perspective on the Anatomy, one of ironic distancing, they are contained and 
dispelled by another, otherwise preponderant mood of anxious, insistent encyclopaedism.
51
 
 
The Anatomy exudes, throughout, manifest disquiet at the fact that its encyclopaedic 
project remains unfulfillable. The work is characterised by extempore formlessness (1.17) 
precisely because it hopes to record melancholy’s every conceivable manifestation; but even 
in the preface we find Burton reduced to mere repetition in lamenting the impossibility of 
this: ‘To insist in every particular were one of Hercules labours …’, ‘To prosecute the rest 
would require a volume … ’, ‘To insist in all particulars, were an Herculean taske …’ (1.55, 
97, 106). Efforts to enumerate melancholy’s symptoms are dogged by a sense of their 
heterogeneity, hence: ‘Who can sufficiently speake of these symptoms? … The foure and 
twenty letters make no more variety of words in divers languages, then melancholy conceipts 
produce diversity of symptomes … Who can … confine them into method?’ (1.407-8). 
‘Confining’ melancholy is exactly Burton’s aspiration, and the failure to achieve this—the 
more one reads, the further the horizon to be plotted recedes into the distance—produces an 
undercurrent of anxiety. The very feverishness with which this text strives to record all there 
is to say of its subject intimates the forlorn nature of its author’s struggle to fend off 
melancholy. There is no better illustration of that than the vast ‘Consolatory Digression’ 
(2.125-207)—in truth, less a ‘Digression’ than Partition 2’s argumentative heart. The 
Digression attempts to epitomise all the best consolations against suffering offered from Plato 
to Cardano. Even as it does so, however, it is beleaguered by a sense of its inadequacy. At the 
outset, realising his excursus will sound platitudinous, Burton heckles himself (ironically, in 
Pliny’s voice): ‘say something I never read … before, or else hold thy peace’ (2.126). In 
practice, all he has to offer is indeed recycled wisdom: ‘Non meus hic sermo, ’tis not my 
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speech this, but of … Austin, Bernard, Christ.’ Despite that, the divine thrice insists, ‘Yet I 
will goe on, for this must needs doe some good … comfort and ease a little’ (2.125-6). 
Subsequently, weighing the infinitude of human afflictions, Burton concedes that ‘to divert 
all I cannot hope’, resolving instead ‘to point alone at some few of the chiefest’ (2.190), but 
even this attempt at circumscription degenerates into lists: ‘Looke for more in Isocrates, 
Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus, &c.’ (2.206). Here again is the self-consuming Anatomy, 
betraying its impotence before melancholy; yet Burton persisted, nonetheless, in his project to 
impart consolation.  
 
Tristram Shandy directly reflects the Anatomy’s forms of playfulness. As Jackson notes, 
Volume V’s epigraph alludes to Burton’s ‘Democritus dixit’ remark, and the rope and vessel 
larceny images are repeated verbatim in this volume’s opening chapter (TS 1.404, 408).52 By 
plagiarising specifically Burton’s jokes about plagiarism, Sterne redoubled their ironic 
denuding of every pose of originality and hence authority. Equally, Tristram (like Burton) 
button-holes and goads his ‘fair reader’. He makes a joke of refusing to disclose the nature of 
his own relationship with Jenny, urges ‘Madam’ to keep rereading Volume I, chapter 19, 
until she has grasped why Mrs Shandy was no papist, and advises those who would picture 
Widow Wadman to draw their own mistresses (1.56, 64-5, 2.566). Meanwhile, Volume IX’s 
epigraph adopts a quotation from Julius Scaliger (lifted from Burton’s preface to Partition 3) 
imploring readers not to demur if Sterne sports too facetiously with them (AM 3.8, TS 2.731). 
Here, then, is Burton’s reader-focused vacillation writ large. But if, in these respects, the 
works compare, what Jackson’s incisive comparison misses is the extent to which the two 
diverge in their attitudes to encyclopaedism.  
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That difference is best illustrated by Volume V, chapter 3, of Tristram Shandy in which 
Sterne has Walter mouth a parody of Burton’s ‘Consolatory Digression’. The burlesquing of 
the Anatomy’s encyclopaedism is advertised immediately. Where the ‘Digression’ had 
opened by declaring itself a digest of nineteen different authors, Sterne (drawing from the 
same list of names) makes a joke of indebtedness: ‘’Tis either Plato, or Plutarch, or Seneca, 
or Xenophon, or Epictetus, or Theophrastus, or Lucian—or someone perhaps of later date’—
more names follow—‘or possibly it may be some divine or father of the church’—yet more 
names, before the closing bathos—‘who affirms that it is … natural … to weep for the loss of 
… children’ (TS 1.418). Walter then embarks on consoling himself for the like loss with a 
medley of ‘fine sayings’ (1.421) appropriated from Member 5 of Burton’s ‘Digression’, but 
now delivered so disjointedly that their platitudinous quality is foregrounded and the source 
whence they stem parodied—witness the following stilted, staccato sequence, a collage of 
Burtonisms:  
 
“My son is dead!—so much the better;—’tis a shame in such a tempest to have but one 
anchor.” 
“But he is gone for ever from us!—be it so … he is but risen … from a banquet before he had 
got drunken.” 
“The Thracians wept when a child was born … and feasted and made merry when a man 
went out of the world; and with reason.”  
[And so on.] (1.424) 
 
Such sequences suggest that a reservation which Burton admitted only initially in his 
‘Digression’ (‘Non meus hic sermo’) subtends Sterne’s whole chapter, and to comic effect. 
The derivative, fatuous nature of Walter’s sentiments is constantly evident. Furthermore, 
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when Walter recapitulates Burton’s comparison between the demise of ancient cities and the 
mutability of human life, seguing in the process into a ventriloquizing of Servius Sulpicius’ 
first-person account of a voyage around Greece, this, too, is reduced to mockery by Toby’s 
uncomprehendingly literalist enquiry: just when did Walter make this Hellenistic expedition 
(TS 1.421-3, AM 2.181-2)? In fact, Walter’s entire speech descends into self-parody because 
it palpably becomes another of his hobby-horses. Bobby, whose death ostensibly occasions 
Walter’s self-consolation, is plainly forgotten amidst an exhilarating rhetorical gallop: ‘my 
father’s eloquence was too rapid to stay for any man—away it went’ (TS 1.425). Parental 
grief opens the chapter, threatening to cast a melancholy shadow over it: Cicero’s distraught 
words quoted here, ‘O my Tullia! my daughter! my child!—still, still, still,—’twas O my 
Tullia’ (1.419), pointedly recall the ‘still, still, still thinking of it’ definitive, for Burton, of 
melancholic conceits. But by the chapter’s end threatened despair has yielded to hobby-
horsical vitality and the ‘Consolatory Digression’s’ earnest, encyclopaedic pretensions have 
been ridiculed to sceptical effect, accentuating a doubting tendency occasionally 
acknowledged but never ultimately capitulated to in the original Anatomy.  
 
Tristram Shandy includes meditations on various encyclopaedic projects ranging from 
Walter’s Tristra-paedia to compendia of rhetoric. Each descends into amusing absurdity; 
each provokes a sense of robust scepticism about man’s intellectual pretensions.53 The largest 
of the adventures in intellectual exhaustiveness satirised here is the novel itself, Tristram’s 
project to narrate his Life and Opinions. This, above all, exposes Sterne’s divergence from 
Burton. Tristram’s reader is repeatedly asked to contemplate the difficulty of framing a 
narrative whose intersecting characters each demand to have their tale told first. The problem 
of getting on to the midwife in Volume I is a case in point, her story suffering prolonged 
interruption to accommodate the cameo of Yorick. Tristram frets, likewise, about just where 
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to insert the affair of Trim and Bridget breaking Toby’s drawbridge. By the end of Volume 
III narrative threads have so proliferated that Tristram complains of ‘a hundred difficulties 
which I have promised to clear up, and a thousand … domestic misadventures crouding in 
upon me’; and that barrage of ‘things to do’ prevents him, for volumes on end, from fulfilling 
his ‘earnest desire’ to narrate Toby’s amours (1.278, 400). Those whose tales Tristram 
chronicles assume lives of their own so that not until Volume III, when ‘All my heroes are off 
my hands’ momentarily, is he free to write a long-delayed author’s preface (1.226). The 
novel becomes so much its own world that surreal images such as the door that opens ‘in the 
next chapter but one’ abound (1.212). In this context the aspiration to produce an 
encyclopaedic autobiography founders. By the middle of Volume IV Tristram is  
 
one whole year older than I was this time twelve-month … and no farther than to my first 
day’s life—[so that] I have three hundred and sixty-four days more life to write just now, 
than when I first set out … As at this rate I should just live 364 times faster than I should 
write—It must follow … that the more I write, the more I shall have to write. (1.341-2)  
 
The comparison with Burton’s plight in trying to track melancholy’s metamorphoses is 
emphatic. 
 
 The difference, however, is that, even as Tristram’s predicament commands a certain 
pathos, it is also made pervasively delightful. The story’s endless unfoldings become 
occasions for mock-dramatic jokes, witness the promise that such-and-such a problem ‘shall 
be solved,—but not in the next chapter’ (1.125). The digressions that intervene are framed as 
nodes of pleasure rather than frustration, Sterne relishing the capricious paths they steer in the 
squiggly lines by which he represents the courses plotted in Volumes I to V (2.570-1), or 
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impudently insisting in Volume IX, chapter 14, that the digression he has been adumbrating 
was always destined for chapter 15 so that 14 must be put to some other, random use (2.765). 
Whereas Burton’s digressions (especially when ludic) are incidental and circumscribed, 
Sterne’s proliferate to become the essence, even the monomania, of their parent novel.54 They 
are, by Tristram’s reckoning, ‘the sun-shine … the life, the soul of reading’ (1.81). The Life 
thus teaches readers to regard its encyclopaedic abundances not as burdensome but as ‘a 
delicious riot of things’ (2.595), not contingent but central. Furthermore, Sterne quickly 
identifies in the astronomical observation that diurnal motions are encompassed within 
annual ones a metaphor which rationalises his practice:  
 
I have constructed the main work and the adventitious parts of it with such intersections, and 
have so complicated and involved the digressive and progressive movements, one wheel 
within another, that the whole machine, in general, has been kept a-going;—and … shall be 
kept a-going these forty years. (1.80-2) 
 
As Lamb shows, this claim crystallises Sterne’s capacity to adopt a double perspective in 
respect of his material. The novel proves at once sensitive to the melancholy of a human 
condition that defies ordering—the ordering of comprehensive biography and of effective 
encyclopaedic intellectual projects—yet able to relieve that melancholy by casting such 
failures in a good-humoured, ironic light. Both these attitudes are perpetually co-present in 
Tristram Shandy, whereas Burton could only oscillate between them, more often than not 
inclining towards the former: an intimation of melancholy at his project’s fated nature. 
 
V 
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I have argued that, in the hands of Swift and Pope, the humoral conception of melancholy 
was simultaneously a discourse to take seriously and a language to satirise (not least as self-
parodying). Both writers mocked melancholy for its factitiousness yet could also recognise its 
value, the benefit of being well deceived. ‘Madness’ need not be so mad after all, and ruling 
passions—once thought aberrant, now deemed normative—might be objects of scorn one 
moment, of amused indulgence the next. Sterne, likewise, found in the mind’s capacity for 
self-torment grounds for melancholy but also for delightful hobby-horsicalness. Equally, his 
novel’s parodic reductions of encyclopaedism could stimulate pathos in the face of man’s 
failure to create intellectual order, yet also the pleasure of abandoning oneself to the ‘riot’ of 
all things digressive. Such were the fruits of these writers’ encounters with Burton. However, 
their pirouettes reveal, too, a wider tendency in the Scriblerian tradition: a penchant for 
entertaining contrary ideas and weighing them equally, so that each position, being always 
inscribed with an awareness of the other, can only ever be a provisional commitment. Swift, 
Pope and Sterne’s texts invite us to regard this harbouring of Janus-faced thoughts as a 
necessity of life, one that demands an ironic form of consciousness in which irony betokens 
provisionality of judgement and the withholding of some part of oneself from one’s every 
intellectual commitment. We might interpret this predilection for ironic perspectivism as a 
late fruit of the taste for disputation in utramque partem, a manifestation of the Academic 
scepticism latent in the Ciceronian rhetoric favoured by Renaissance thinkers; or as the 
flowering of an outlook always residually present in Menippean satire but which the skill and 
notoriety of Swift, Pope and Sterne brought out of the humanist closet into the public sphere 
of eighteenth-century literary culture. One might root Scriblerian perspectivism, also, in 
Restoration libertinism and the literary practice of Rochester, Buckingham et al. (from whom 
Swift and Pope learned their craft). After all, that libertinism turned upon an aesthetic of 
performativity developed from the literary ventriloquism prevalent in Civil War parodic 
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verse.
55
 Libertine writers embraced heterodox, iconoclastic attitudes, thinking their way into 
unthinkable positions, but left it inscrutable (to those outside their coterie) just how deeply or 
sincerely they were committed to such views.
56
 However the kind of labile intellect on which 
I have focused began though, it produced in the trio of authors discussed here a variety of 
sceptical perspectivism significantly removed from the standard, Popkin-inspired histories of 
eighteenth-century scepticism which privilege Pyrrhonism and fideism; an ironic 
consciousness, too, that might lead us to question how far so-called Romantic irony was 
really the innovation of the Jena Romantics and how far, on the contrary, it began with 
Scriblerian intellectual fluidity and with readings of Burton.
57
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